Politics, Security and Early Ideas of ‘Greater Malaysia’, 1945-1961 by Fernando, Joseph M. & Rajagopal, Shanthiah
 
Archipel
Études interdisciplinaires sur le monde insulindien 
94 | 2017
Varia
Politics, Security and Early Ideas of ‘Greater
Malaysia’, 1945-1961
Politique, sécurité et premières idées de ‘Plus Grande Malaisie’, 1945-1961








Date of publication: 6 December 2017





Joseph M. Fernando and Shanthiah Rajagopal, « Politics, Security and Early Ideas of ‘Greater
Malaysia’, 1945-1961 », Archipel [Online], 94 | 2017, Online since 06 December 2017, connection on 01
May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/archipel/445  ; DOI : 10.4000/archipel.445 
Association Archipel
Archipel 94, Paris, 2017, p. 97-119
12The Federation of Malaysia was formed in September 1963 after years 
of backroom discussions, planning and, inally, very intense and delicate 
negotiations between late 1961 and 1963. The origins of the federation, 
however, remain a contentious issue among scholars. The idea of a wider 
political entity, encompassing the Federation of Malaya, the British-controlled 
territories of Sarawak, North Borneo, Singapore, and Brunei, was formally 
announced by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of the independent 
Federation of Malaya, at a speech given to the Foreign Correspondents 
Association of Southeast Asia in Singapore on 27 May 1961. In his speech, 
Tunku suggested the desirability of a “closer association” of the territories of 
Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei to strengthen political 
and economic cooperation.3 The announcement was a major departure from the 
previous position of his Alliance Party government vis-à-vis the merger with 
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Singapore and surprised many political observers —including the governors 
of the British-controlled Borneo states— because Malayan leaders had been 
turning down proposals by Singapore leaders for a direct merger with Malaya 
for some time.4
The formation of a broader federation between Malaya and Singapore, 
which was separated from Malaya in 1946, was contentious for several 
reasons. First, was the Malayan government’s concern over the racial 
demographic balance. A merger between Malaya and Singapore and the 
inclusion of one million Chinese from the city-state would upset the political 
balance held by the Malay majority in Malaya.5 Second, an equally pressing 
issue was that of the perceived communist threat emanating from Singapore. 
There was a fear among Singapore leaders, particularly the ruling People’s 
Action Party (PAP) that, after the split in the party in 1961 and the formation 
of the Barisan Sosialis (which opposed the merger) communists could come 
to power in Singapore. Barisan Sosialis was viewed as being dominated by the 
pro-Communists.6 Parties in Malaya such as the ruling Alliance Party and the 
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) were also concerned about the communist 
inluence from Singapore.7 In addition, Singapore leaders had approached 
Malayan leaders several times before 1961, seeking a direct merger as they 
felt the small city-state was not economically viable. The inclusion of the 
Borneo territories raised their own peculiar issues of integration such as 
questions of political and economic autonomy in these territories. These 
states were politically backward and there was some concern regarding the 
potential dominance of the Malayan state in the proposed wider federation.8 
Nevertheless, Tunku’s statement started a process of intense discussions and, 
later, constitutional negotiations that led to the formation of the Federation 
of Malaysia on 16 September 1963, comprising the Federation of Malaya, 
Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo (later known as Sabah). Brunei, which 
was involved in the inal negotiations, opted out of the new federation at the 
last minute.
The formation of the federation of Malaysia has received much attention 
from scholars in recent years with the availability of declassiied documents 
related to its formation. There are, however, considerable disagreements 
among scholars on the origins of the idea of the wider federation and the 
underlying reasons for the creation of such an odd entity. Sometimes the 
4. Tan Tai Yong, Creating “Greater Malaysia,” Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2009, pp. 33-48. See also Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story, Singapore, Times Editions, 
1998, pp. 363-364.
5. Tan Tai Yong, Creating “Greater Malaysia,” p. 30.
6. Ibid., p. 31.
7. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
8. Ibid., pp. 16-18.
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origin of the federation is attributed to Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman’s 
statement of 27 May 1961 urging a closer association of these territories. This 
is viewed as a starting point for a serious consideration of the federation idea 
as the formal talks began after this announcement. A closer examination of the 
primary documents on the formation of the federation, however, indicates that 
the origin of the idea of a wider federation has much deeper roots and Tunku’s 
statement coincided with substantive high level discussions that were taking 
place in the Colonial Ofice and in Southeast Asia on the future of the British-
controlled territories in the region at that time. In fact, British Commissioner-
General for Southeast Asia Malcolm MacDonald9 had conducted serious 
discussions on the subject of closer relations among the British-controlled 
territories in Borneo and Malaya as early as 1951. Existing studies have not 
discussed adequately the deeper origins of the idea of the federation, focusing 
mainly on the formal discussions in the post-1961 period. This article traces 
the formation of the federation to more varied and complex origins in the post-
war period when a convergence of interests of the various parties provided a 
new impetus for the establishment of the broader federation. We show that 
the idea of a wider federation, although it dates back to the pre-World War II 
period, was taken up most seriously in the early 1950s, and again between 1960 
and 1961 when new developments in the region required a reconsideration of 
the idea and prompted Tunku to formally propose it.
Ideas of closer association
Existing works provide an inadequate picture of the developments which 
led to the formation of the federation of Malaysia in 1963. Matthew Jones, 
for example, notes that the initiative for the formation of the Malaysian 
federation “came from different sources” but does not deal substantively with 
these sources and alludes to Tunku’s primary role in the process. His study 
is focused largely on the intense process of negotiations which took place in 
the later stages leading to the formation of the federation.10 A.J. Stockwell’s 
volume of British Documents on the formation of the federation of Malaysia 
is a selective compilation of related documents and does not relect the earlier 
discussions adequately.11 While his introductory section contains a useful 
9. Malcolm MacDonald was the son of British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald who 
became a Labour Member of Parliament in 1929. He was Secretary of State for Colonies in 
1935 and between 1938 and 1940. He served as British Governor-General for Southeast Asia in 
1946-1948 and as Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia from 1948-1955. Between 1955 
and 1960 he served as British High Commissioner in India. See A.J. Stockwell, British policy 
and Malay politics, 1942-1948, Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 
1979, p. 180.
10. Matthew Jones, “Creating Malaysia: Singapore Security, the Borneo Territories and the 
Contours of the British Policy, 1961-1963,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
vol. 28, no. 2, 2000, pp. 85-109.
11. A.J. Stockwell, Malaysia, London, The Stationary Ofice (RSO), 2004.
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discussion, it does not deal suficiently with the pre-May 1961 discussions, 
rather focusing largely on the formal process of negotiations leading to the 
establishment of the federation in September 1963. Karl Hack has contended 
that the formation of Malaysia had “much to do with local developments, little 
to do with British plotting,” and concluded that while Britain had long pressed 
Malaya to associate with Singapore this had been ignored.12 This is not entirely 
relective of the chain of events that led to the formation of the federation. Tan 
Tai Yong’s book, Creating “Greater Malaysia,” provides a more substantive 
discussion of the formation of the federation but treats the pre-1961 period 
summarily.13 Tan merely observes that the new state was the outcome of a 
series of decisions made by British policy-makers and local political elites 
between 1960 and 1963.14 Other earlier works, based largely on secondary 
sources, provide interesting theories on the formation of Malaysia but do not 
shed much light on the early origins of the federation as these scholars did not 
have access to important oficial documents on the formation of the federation. 
These include works by Mohamed Nordin Sopiee and G.P. Means.15 Sopiee 
notes that while most accounts of the developments leading to the formation 
of Malaysia begin in May 1961, a case could be made for starting the analysis 
in 1960.16 In addition, while they hint at the earlier origins of the idea of the 
federation, the biographical accounts of the two main igures involved in the 
formation of Malaysia, i.e. the Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew17 
and Ghazali Shaie18 –later the Foreign Minister of Malaysia– do not discuss 
in any depth the developments leading up to 1961. Invariably, the existing 
studies do not suficiently discuss the earlier origins of the federation.
Ideas for a closer association between the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, 
Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei, all of which were under the formal 
or informal control of the British since the 19th century, were put forward 
from a very early period. The earliest suggestion of the possibility of closer 
association between the Malayan states and the Borneo territories was made 
by Lord Brassey who suggested that these territories be merged ‘into one large 
colony’ in the House of Lords in 1887.19 Following this, senior British oficials 
12. Karl Hack, Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore, 
1941-1968, Richmond, Curzon, 2001, p. 275.
13. Tan Tai Yong, Creating “Greater Malaysia,” p. 2.
14. Ibid.
15. Mohamed Nordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, Kuala Lumpur, 
University of Malaya Press, 1976, pp. 91-124; G.P. Means, Malaysian Politics, London, Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1970, pp. 292-312.
16. Mohamed Nordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, p. 135.
17. Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story, 1998.
18. Ghazalie Shaie, Memoir on the Formation of Malaysia, Bangi, Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia, 1998, pp. 16-17. He claims he had ideas on the federation as early as 1948.
19. Mohamed Nordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, p. 127. See also 
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in the region and some Colonial Ofice oficials remarked from time to time 
on the potential beneit of a closer association of these territories. These 
suggestions, however, remained mere ideas without any clear formula or plan 
of action and were not taken up seriously. British planning in London during 
the conlict over post-war Malaya did envision the possibility of Singapore 
being part of Malaya, but the 1946 Malayan Union scheme left Singapore out 
because of the importance of the city-state as a strategic British naval base. 
It is really in the immediate post-war Second World War period that serious 
thought and attention was given to the idea of a wider federation as the pace 
of decolonisation increased. 
There was a general feeling among British administrators in London and 
in Southeast Asia in the post-war period that a closer political and economic 
union between the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories 
would make the smaller territories in particular more viable entities. The 
Borneo territories of Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei collectively had a 
population of about one million and British oficials felt that they would not be 
able to survive on their own amid the larger states of Indonesia, the Philippines 
and China. In the immediate post-war period some important British policy 
documents make references intimating that Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) 
and the Colonial Ofice favourably viewed the possibility of a merger between 
the Malayan federation and Singapore. In others, there were suggestions of 
the potential beneit of a closer association between the British territories in 
Borneo initially, and over the longer term some kind of cooperation between 
all these British-controlled territories. However, Colonial Ofice oficials as 
well as senior administrators in these territories recognised that numerous 
obstacles remained in pursuing such a goal and that these objectives could 
only be brought about over a longer period and with the support of the peoples 
in these states.
HMG also made some public pronouncements about the possibility of 
closer association between the British territories in the post-war period. A 
minute of the Governor-General’s conference held in Penang on 20 August 
1946, for example, refers to closer association between the Malayan Union 
and Singapore amid concerns that they may be drifting apart, stating the need: 
“to consider the situation in relation to the possibility of the Malayan Union and Singapore 
being more closely associated constitutionally at a not too distant date.”20 
A brief prepared for the Secretary of State in October 1951, reinforced this 
early attitude: 
Tan Tai Yong, Creating ‘Greater Malaysia,’ pp. 1-25.
20. A.J. Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Ofice (HMSO), 1995, 
pp. 256-257.
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“Public pronouncements by HMG have to date been conined to two statements of policy in 
the 1946-47 White Paper on the Malayan Constitution. The 1946 White Paper (CMD6724) 
stated that it was no part of HMG’s policy ‘to preclude or prejudice in any way the fusion 
of Singapore and the Malayan Union in a wider union at a later date should it be considered 
that such a course were desirable.’” 
In the 1947 White Paper (CMD7171) it was stated that HMG still held 
this view and believed “that the question of Singapore joining the Federation 
should be considered on its merits and in the light of local opinion at an 
appropriate time.21” Thus in the immediate period after the war there was a 
strong feeling among British oficials that the tiny island of Singapore should 
eventually merge with Malaya. Nevertheless, very little progress was made 
on these statements of intent until the British Commissioner-General for 
Southeast Asia Malcolm MacDonald initiated serious discussions with local 
political leaders, at times against the advice of the Colonial Ofice. Thus it is 
important to consider MacDonald’s role in the early origins of the federation.
MacDonald’s “Grand Design”
MacDonald was attracted to the idea of a wider entity encompassing all the 
British controlled territories in Southeast Asia to create a larger economic and 
political entity that could compete with its neighbours and facilitate eventual 
decolonisation and he therefore initiated several high-level discussions in the 
early 1950s. MacDonald’s particular interest in the broader federation can in 
part be credited to the general British post-war decolonisation policy of “unite 
and quit” which intended to create viable broader territorial units and nation-
states.22 Further, as the most senior British oficer in Southeast Asia, he was 
very familiar with local conditions and personally felt a broader federation 
would be beneicial to the otherwise smaller existing entities and strongly 
promoted the federation despite some reservations in the Colonial Ofice. 
He was also aware of the potential broader threat to the Southeast Asian 
states from the spread of communism.23 In 1951, MacDonald held several 
discussions with the leading Malayan political leader Dato’ Onn Jaafar, the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) chief and member of the 
Federal Legislative Council, on the idea of a ‘closer association’ between 
Malaya and Singapore on the one hand and the Borneo territories on the other. 
The primary records indicate that MacDonald discussed this idea of a closer 
association with Onn on 29 October 1951 and then wrote to the Colonial 
Ofice of the positive response he received and the need to pursue the issue. He 
noted that Onn showed a readiness to “consider ways and means of gradually 
21. Brief for the Secretary of State’s Visit [to the Federation and Singapore], undated (c. October 
1951), CO (Colonial Ofice) 1022/61 (230).
22. Karl Hack, Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia, pp. 131-133.
23. Ibid., pp. 137-143. See also Tan Tai Yong, Creating “Greater Malaysia,” pp. 17-18.
Politics, Security and Early Ideas of “Greater Malaysia,” 1945-1961 103
Archipel 94, Paris, 2017
bringing the Federation and Singapore closer together.”24 It was agreed that 
a small group of oficials from the federation and Singapore would have a 
preliminary meeting on the proposal at Bukit Serene (MacDonald’s residence 
in Johore Bahru) and then hold another meeting under the auspices of the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association to further discuss the idea. The 
Colonial Ofice, however, felt there was no public demand for closer political 
association in the federation or Singapore.25 MacDonald and the Singapore 
Governor F. Gimson discussed the matter with some unoficial members of the 
Singapore legislature on 18 December 1951. A little later, MacDonald realised 
that Onn’s inluence in Malayan politics began to wane after he formed the 
Independence of Malaya Party (IMP)26 and informed the Colonial Ofice that 
there was a need to include “important shades of Malay opinion which Dato’ 
Onn and his IMP colleagues no longer fully represent.”27 This was a reference 
to the UMNO under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman who succeeded 
Onn. MacDonald also noted that the Borneo territories favoured a closer 
association if it also involved closer association with Singapore. 
The Colonial Ofice, however, had reservations about MacDonald’s idea of 
closer political association and felt it was a bit premature.28 Gimson discussed 
this matter with the federation’s High Commissioner, Sir Gerald Templer, in 
February 1952, and noted that closer association should be achieved at “the 
earliest possible date.”29 A further meeting on the idea was held on 18 May 
1953 and the consensus reached was that local opinion was less in favour of 
the idea. Templer observed that while a year earlier he had felt it was possible 
to make some progress towards the goal of a closer association, “during the 
last year feeling in both territories had become more opposed to the idea.”30 
Singapore Governor Sir J. Nicoll agreed with Templer’s views, noting that 
constitutional advance “would make it even more dificult.”31 The meeting 
nevertheless concluded that their continued objective “should still be the 
closest political association between Singapore and the Federation that we 
24. MacDonald to Colonial Ofice, 29 Oct. 1951, CO 1022/61 (232).
25. Brief for Secretary of State’s Visit [to Federation and Singapore], undated (c. October 
1951), CO 1022/61 (230).
26. Dato’ Onn Jaafar had left the UMNO and formed the Independence of Malaya (IMP) party in 
September 1951 after the UMNO refused to open its membership to non-Malays. Interestingly, 
it was Tunku Abdul Rahman who replaced Onn as the UMNO president in 1951, and who was 
later to play a prominent role in the formation of the federation of Malaysia.
27. MacDonald to Colonial Ofice, 29 Jan. 1952, CO 1022/61 (220).
28. Minute by J.D. Higham, 6 Feb. 1952, CO 1022/61.
29. Gimson to MacDonald, 29 Feb.1952, CO 1022/61.
30. Minute of meeting to discuss closer association between Federation and Singapore held on 
18 May 1953, CO 1022/61 (128).
31. Ibid.
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can get local opinion to accept.”32 It was felt that the setting up of a Joint 
Federation/Singapore Co-ordination Committee under the chairmanship 
of MacDonald would assist in reaching this objective. In a brieing to the 
Cabinet in April 1954, the Secretary of State noted that constitutional changes 
in Singapore “need not prove an obstacle to the objective of closer association 
between the Federation and Singapore.”33
MacDonald continued to pursue his idea despite reservations expressed 
by Templer and Nicoll. He began to market the idea further in the Borneo 
states. Preliminary discussions were held in 1954 between MacDonald and 
the governors of Sabah and Sarawak. On 28 October 1954 a high-level 
discussion was held in Kuching, the capital of Sarawak, between MacDonald, 
the Governor of Sarawak (Sir Anthony Abell), the Governor of North Borneo 
(R.E. Turnbull), Sir John Martin (Assistant Undersecretary of State in the 
Colonial Ofice) and R.W. Jakeman (Assistant Commissioner-General for 
Colonial Affairs). At this meeting MacDonald emphasised the importance of 
a closer association, noting that “the ultimate aim, if it proved practicable and 
if it met with the approval of the people concerned was a federation of all 
ive Malaya/Borneo Territories.”34 As a irst step, he suggested, there should 
be a closer association of the three Borneo territories, which would then be 
followed by an association between this group and the Malayan territories.35 
This was the irst real push, initiated by MacDonald, for a wider federation 
of all ive territories. The governors of Sarawak and North Borneo, however, 
were somewhat hesitant and noted that there would be some reluctance on the 
part of the Borneo states. Those present at the meeting nevertheless agreed “the 
ultimate aim was some sort of Confederation between all ive Territories.”36 
It was also agreed that the Borneo territories should be brought together irst 
before attempting a “constitutional partnership” with Malaya.37 The plan for a 
wider confederation thus took a irmer shape at this meeting.
MacDonald continued to pursue this idea of a wider federation during 
his remaining time in ofice in Southeast Asia. For example, the Joint 
Co-ordination Committee formed in 1954 between the Federation of Malaya 
and Singapore to discuss bilateral matters was also asked to discuss the issue 
of closer association between the Federation, Singapore and the Borneo 
Territories. Leaving nothing to chance, when it appeared that he may be posted 
32. Minute of meeting to discuss closer association between Federation and Singapore held on 
18 May 1953, CO 1022/61 (130).
33. Paper on Constitutional Changes in Singapore, CO 1030/78 (49), April 1954.
34. Note of Meeting in Kuching to discuss closer association between Borneo Territories, 28 
Oct. 1954, CO 1030/164 (178).
35. Ibid.
36. Note of Meeting in Kuching to discuss closer association between Borneo Territories, 28 
Oct. 1954, CO 1030/164 (181).
37. MacDonald to John Martin, 7 Jan. 1955, CO 1030/164 (169).
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elsewhere after the irst federal elections in Malaya in July 1955, MacDonald 
began to more earnestly push his idea with the Secretary of State for Colonies, 
arguing the beneits of such a federation. On 2 April 1955, shortly before the 
irst federal elections in the Federation, MacDonald wrote to the Secretary of 
State, Alan Lennox-Boyd, of the possibility of closer association between the 
Federation and Singapore. MacDonald wrote: 
“But I hope that, whatever the (July 1955) Election results, the reformed Committee [Joint 
Co-ordination Committee] will conirm the impression given at the Committee’s last 
meeting that leaders in all parties in both countries are ready to make the Committee the 
instrument for planning closer political association. I think the prospects of this are quite 
good, and that if the Committee is prudently and yet boldly guided, all the dificulties can 
be overcome and a satisfactory accord reached.”38
MacDonald reiterated that Britain’s ultimate objective 
“... is a Confederation between the ive present territories of the Federation of Malaya, 
Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei,” explicitly stating the long-term intentions 
of the British government. It was agreed that this would be done in two stages: irst, 
the combination of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore; and then the three Borneo 
Territories as separate entities; and, second, these two groups were to be brought together 
under one appropriate constitutional government.”39 
He admitted that he had been “planting the idea” in the minds of political 
leaders in the Federation and Singapore for the last few years, adding: 
“Because of the political ‘backwardness’ of the Borneo Territories, we have not initiated 
similar private discussion on the subject there, and the Bornean leaders are perhaps less 
aware than those in Malaya of our grand design. Possibly we should begin to propagate the 
idea in Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei.”40 
This letter by MacDonald in April 1955 is the irst mention of what later 
became known as the “Grand Design,” in all Colonial Ofice references to 
the formation of a wider federation among the British controlled territories. 
(Later on, it was replaced by the term ‘Greater Malaysia’.) Thus between 1951 
and 1955 it was MacDonald who personally pursued high-level discussions 
on the idea of a wider federation of British-controlled territories in Southeast 
Asia, even though he faced considerable resistance from the Colonial Ofice 
on the timing for the discussion of the scheme. These discussions were quite 
advanced at the time. His persistence in pushing the idea, it can be argued, led 
to a basic acceptance among the senior oficials both in the Colonial Ofice 
and the British territories in Southeast Asia of the idea of a “Grand Design” 
 
 
38. MacDonald to Secretary of State, 2 April 1955, CO 1030/163 (20).
39. Ibid.
40. MacDonald to Secretary of State, 2 April 1955, CO 1030/163 (25).
106 Joseph M. Fernando and Shanthiah Rajagopal
Archipel 94, Paris, 2017
incorporating all these territories in some form of constitutional relationship 
and this was more evident when the Colonial Ofice resurrected the idea 
subsequently, well before Tunku made his statement in May 1961.
The Secretary of State Alan Lennox-Boyd’s response was not very 
enthusiastic. He felt that it would not be possible for the Committee to do 
much work until after the irst federal elections in the Federation of Malaya 
scheduled to be held in July 1955.41 The lukewarm attitude of the Colonial 
Ofice towards MacDonald’s efforts was inluenced in part by the fact that 
MacDonald’s tenure as Commissioner-General was up for reconsideration 
around this time and it seemed likely that he would be replaced and given 
another posting. Nevertheless a Joint Coordinating Committee (JCC) of 
oficials from Malaya and Singapore in a meeting held on 13 June 1955 
made some interesting conclusions on the issue of closer association. The 
JCC felt that closer association between the two territories was “desirable” 
but recognised that it would be dificult to overcome “some practical 
dificulties and the matter should not be rushed.”42 The JCC agreed that “a 
complete unitary state might be the ultimate aim but it is not practicable in 
the foreseeable future” and that some form of federation between the two 
territories would be easier to attain.43 MacDonald’s idea of a federation clearly 
had gained considerable support among the elites in Malaya and Singapore. 
MacDonald’s term of ofice as Commissioner-General, however, ended in 
July 1955 and in the wake of the Alliance victory in the July elections the 
idea of a closer association lost some momentum temporarily although it 
was to be revived by his successors. His immediate successor, R. H. Scott, 
while recognising the importance of a merger with Singapore did not push 
for the idea as enthusiastically. The initiative to pursue the idea of a wider 
federation was taken up by the Singapore leaders who had been involved in 
the discussions held by MacDonald.
Internal discussions at the Colonial Ofice
Following MacDonald’s departure the Chief Minister of Singapore David 
Marshall and other leaders from the colony such as Lim Yew Hock and 
Lee Kuan Yew, some of whom had been involved in the discussions with 
41. Lennox-Boyd to MacDonald, 2 June 1955, CO 1030/163 (10). MacKintosh of the Colonial 
Ofice noted: “... Mr. MacDonald is again being too sanguine in his estimate of the prospects 
of the J.C.C.”
42. Note on Meeting of Joint Co-ordination Committee, 13 June 1955, CO 1030/161 (146).
43. Ibid. The JCC comprised D.C. Watherston (Chief Secretary), J.P. Hogan (Attorney-General), 
Dato Onn Jaafar (Member for Home Affairs), R.B. Carey (Works), H.S. Lee (Transport), V.M.N 
Menon (Posts and Telecommunications), Panglima Bukit Gantang (Mentri Besar, Perak), 
Tunku Abdul Rahman and Yong Shook Lin (Malayan representatives); W.A.C. Goode (Colonial 
Secretary), E.J. Davies (Attorney-General), Thio Chan Bee, Sir Ewen Ferguson, C.C. Tan, Lim 
Yew Hock, N.A. Mallal and Ahmad bin Mohamed Ibrahim (Singapore representatives).
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MacDonald, began to push for the idea of a merger between Singapore and 
the federation as Malayan independence neared.44 They felt that a separate 
Singapore island nation would not be sustainable economically. Lee Kuan Yew, 
for instance, argued that “the logic of geography and the force of historical, 
ethnic and economic forces all point to the inevitability of merger.”45 On 29 
February 1956, the Singapore Chief Minister David Marshall asked for an 
urgent meeting with the Federation government to discuss “the question of 
future relations between the two territories.” But Malaya’s Chief Minister 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, who had just returned after successful Independence 
talks in London, did not wish to hold a meeting “on such an important subject” 
on short notice, and sought additional information. Marshall then requested 
that the federation government agree to formal talks on closer relations. The 
Tunku, however, was not keen to discuss the subject matter as he felt that it 
could jeopardise the federation’s claim to Independence.46 Marshall, Lim Yew 
Hock and Lee Kuan Yew nevertheless met Tunku informally on 3 March 1956, 
requesting that the terms of the Constitutional Commission for the Federation 
be broadened “to permit consideration of the problem of closer political 
association with Singapore.”47 Tunku rejected their demands stating that any 
attempt to establish a closer political relationship between the two countries 
“must be deferred until after the constitutional commission had reported.”48 
Marshall told the Singapore Legislative Assembly on 7 March 1956 that he 
and Tunku had agreed to commence oficial discussions of a merger after 
the new federation constitution had been inalised.49 Commissioner-General 
R. H. Scott criticised Marshall’s view that the issue at stake was a choice 
between “Singapore’s independence and chaos.”50 Rather, he felt, it was a 
choice between Singapore’s independence and some form of association with 
Malaya. Scott was against independence for Singapore in the near future: 
“My own view is that we should decide deinitely against independence and in favour of 
association with Malaya as the goal; that meanwhile we should go on governing Singapore 
as long as we can.”51 
On 14 June 1956, Singapore’s new Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock travelled 
to Kuala Lumpur for two days of informal exploratory talks on a merger 
44. Tan Tai Yong, Creating ‘Greater Malaysia,’ pp. 34-41.
45. Ibid., p. 37.
46. Sir R. Black to Secretary of State for Colonies, CO 1030/161 (82), 1 March 1956.
47. High Commissioner Sir Donald MacGillivray to Secretary of State for Colonies, CO 
1030/161, 9 March 1956.
48. Ibid.
49. Statement by Chief Minister David Marshall, CO 1030/161, 7 March 1956.
50. R.H. Scott to British Prime Minister, 8 March 1956, CO 1030/161 (78).
51. Ibid.
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between the Federation and Singapore.52 
In spite of the lack of progress with regard to the idea of a broader federation 
after MacDonald’s departure, the British government was nevertheless 
committed to the idea over the longer term because of the perceived lack of 
economic viability of the smaller territories as independent entities and the 
potential for these territories to fall to communist inluence in the context of 
the on-going Cold War in Southeast Asia. Britain’s position is clear from an 
explanatory note written by a senior Colonial Ofice oficial, J.B. Johnston, 
dated 19 November 1956, in response to queries from Washington on the 
matter:
All the logic of history, geography and economics points to union with the Federation as 
Singapore’s obvious political destiny. We do not believe Singapore could sustain a truly 
independent existence – it is a city rather than a country. If it were left on its own, it would 
be extremely vulnerable to the domination of some outside power, and if that power were 
not ourselves or the Federation, it would be most likely to be Communist China. We would 
therefore welcome a reunion of Singapore and the Federation, but this is not something we 
can effect ourselves. If it is successful it must spring from mutual interest and agreement of 
the two parties to the deal. At the moment one party –Singapore– is very keen on merger, 
chiely as the door to complete political independence. The other party –or at least the 
Government at present in power– are strongly opposed to the merger on both racial and 
political grounds.53
It is clear thus that after MacDonald had left Malaya the idea of a wider 
federation was pursued by Singapore’s leaders and British oficials. While 
‘substantive’ discussions on the wider federation had been held in the 1950s54, the 
matter took on a greater degree of importance and urgency in 1960. As Malaya 
achieved Independence in 1957, the British government began to give more 
thought to the future of the smaller British-controlled territories in Southeast 
Asia –Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei– and there was renewed interest 
in the idea of a wider federation which again becomes the focus of intense 
discussions. This idea, often referred to as the “Grand Design”,55 was in keeping 
with British policies elsewhere in combining, where possible, smaller territories 
into bigger units as part of the decolonisation process.
In early 1960, a renewed enthusiasm on the idea of closer association is 
evident on the heel of some important developments and discussions in late 
195956. One of the main sources for this change in attitude appears to be a 
52. Reuters report, 14 June 1956, CO 1030/162 (27).
53. J.B. Johnston to F.S. Tomlinson, 19 Nov. 1956, CO 1030/162 (9).
54. See, for example, Bourdillon to Melville, 5 Dec 1959 and enclosed draft of assembly speech by 
Goh Keng Swee, CO 1030/972 (1), and Bourdillon to Melville, 24 Dec. 1959, CO 1030/971 (6). 
55. The term has been used for many years to describe various ideas which from time to time 
have been put forward for a closer association between British Borneo Territories, Sarawak, North 
Borneo and Brunei, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya. See DO 169/27 (210), c. July 1961.
56. Bourdillon to Melville, 24 Dec. 1959, CO 1030/972 (6). Tory had a discussion with Lee 
Kuan Yew on 24 December 1959 during which he pointed out to Lee the obstacles he would 
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letter and a report written in January 1960 by Sir Geoffrey Tory, the British 
High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, to the Colonial Ofice on the issue of 
merger between the federation and Singapore and economic relations between 
both territories following Singapore’s proposal for a common market.57 Tory 
had told Lee of the Tunku’s opposition to merger and statements by Lee that 
merger was a ‘foreseeable possibility’, were politically embarrassing and an 
encouragement to his opponents.58 
Following Tory’s letters and report on relations between the federation 
and Singapore, the Colonial Ofice felt that a general discussion should be 
held on HMG’s policy towards future relations between the federation and 
Singapore.59 The Colonial Ofice suggested that the Commonwealth Prime 
Minister’s conference in June 1960 might serve as an opportunity to attempt 
to win the Tunku’s conidence regarding Singapore.60 Considerable attention 
is given in the Colonial Ofice’s correspondence to inding a gentle way of 
approaching the Tunku during the Prime Minister’s Conference in order 
to raise the question of future relations between Malaya and Singapore.61 
Several attempts were made in 1960 to win over the Tunku’s reluctance to 
consider a possible merger with Singapore.62 Tory, for example, cautioned the 
Commonwealth Relations Ofice in April 1960: 
“My fear is that if we were to urge the Tunku in direction of closer economic cooperation 
without being able to demonstrate economic gain for federation, he might conclude that we 
were subordinating federation interests to those of Singapore, or that we were pushing the 
Federation towards merger.”63
Selkirk urged that the approach to Tunku should have a “broad political 
basis,” and not mainly underscore economic points; it should also emphasise 
the importance of positive bilateral relations with the Internal Security Council 
face in seeking a more forthcoming attitude from the federation towards Singapore’s problems 
and its battle with the communists. Tory felt that Tunku and Razak’s attitude towards closer 
economic understanding with Singapore was governed by purely political considerations: 
‘They regarded this simply as a irst step towards political merger.’
57. Martin to Hunt, 25 March 1960, CO 1030/972 (15). See also the report by Tory, CO 
1030/972 (E/10), dated 7 Jan. 1960, on talks with Lee Kuan Yew during his visit to Singapore 
from 20-22 Dec 1959.
58. Report by Tory, CO 1030/972 (E/10), dated 7 Jan. 1960, on talks with Lee Kuan Yew during 
his visit to Singapore from 20-22 Dec 1959.
59. Martin to Hunt, 25 March 1960, CO 1030/972 (15).
60. See Minute by W.I.J. Wallace, 20 Jan. 1960, CO 1030/972. See also the report by Tory, CO 
1030/972 (E/10), dated 7 Jan. 1960, on talks with Lee Kuan Yew during his visit to Singapore 
from 20-22 Dec. 1959, CO 1030/972 (10) and Tory to Hunt, and CO 1030/972 (8), 6 January 
1960.
61. Ibid.
62. See, for example, Tory to Commonwealth Relations Ofice, 6 April 1960, CO 1030/972 
(23). See also minute by Wallace, 17 Nov. 1960, CO 1030/972.
63. Tory to Commonwealth Relations Ofice, 8 April 1960, CO 1030/972 (25).
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(ISC) and its work. The ISC discussed security matters in the federation and 
Singapore and included several Malayan ministers.64
The records indicate Tunku’s deputy, Abdul Razak, had become more 
inclined to support the idea of merger and viewed it as a practicable measure 
in view of the rise of leftist parties in Singapore as the colony edged towards 
independence.65 Discussions between Duncan Sandys, the Minister of State for 
Commonwealth Affairs, and Tunku in November 1960 made some headway 
after some careful pre-planning on the part of the Colonial Ofice in raising the 
various issues, including the merger with Singapore.66 British oficials were 
able to convince Razak of the need to pursue the idea of a broader federation. 
Razak appears to have then persuaded the Tunku of the urgency of the matter.67 
Meanwhile, Lee Kuan Yew, encouraged by the British, proposed a ‘wider 
political association’ including the Borneo territories which he felt would be 
more acceptable to Tunku than a straight merger between the federation and 
Singapore.68 He argued that if a merger with Malaya did not take place, it 
was likely that Singapore, after achieving independence, would become “a 
Chinese communist base right in the heart of Southeast Asia with incalculable 
consequences to all territories of the whole region.”69 In his paper, Lee argued 
that a larger federation of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories would 
be the most satisfactory solution for the peoples of the three territories, with 
the added advantage that the British would agree with it.70 Lee felt that it was 
imperative that agreement on constitutional arrangements should be reached 
soon. Singapore was due to re-open constitutional talks with Britain in early 
1963, with independence as a possible next step. He felt that if no constitutional 
advance was achieved, it was likely that the PAP would be replaced by a pro-
Malayan Communist Party and a pro-China Singapore government.
64. Selkirk to Secretary of State, 13 April 1960, CO 1030/972 (27).
65. Selkirk to Macleod, 30 Jan. 1961, CO 1030/978 (119). See also Selkirk to Colonial Ofice, 
30 Jan. 1961, CO 1030/972 (122).
66. See Brief for Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Duncan Sandys for visit of 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, 14 Nov. 1960, CO 1030/972 (98); and meeting with Duncan Sandys 
scheduled 21 Nov. 1960. CO 1030/972 (57). See also Bourdillon to Eugene, 19 Jan. 1961, CO 
1030/972 (121). Bourdillon: “I have now heard from Lord Selkirk that he had not had much 
opportunity to discuss with Mr. Sandys the talks with the Tengku but that Mr. Sandys had told 
him that he had put the problem of Singapore/Federation relations very frankly to the Tengku. 
There had been no unfavourable reaction, but it was not possible to say if the Tengku had 
accepted the propositions which were put to him.”
67. Tan Tai Yong, Creating “Greater Malaysia,” pp. 55-56.
68. Selkirk to Macleod, 30 Jan. 1961, CO 1030/978 (119).’ 
69. Paper on the future of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories by 
Lee Kuan Yew, CO 1030/972 (E203), 9 May 1961.
70. Paper on the future of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories by 
Lee Kuan Yew, CO 1030/972 (E203), 9 May 1961. See also Selkirk to Macleod, 10 May 1961, 
CO 1030/972 (30).
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Meanwhile, the irst substantive renewed discussion of the idea of the 
broader federation was a meeting of heads of the Borneo Territories chaired 
by the Deputy Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, Sir Dennis Allen, 
on 23 January 1960 at Phoenix Park in Singapore.71 Here MacDonald’s 
“Grand Design” and the possibility of Brunei joining the federation of Malaya 
separately was discussed. On the issue of closer association, Allen asked 
the meeting to consider the chances of a wider federation as conceptualised 
by MacDonald in the “Grand Design”; the existing programmes for closer 
association and whether any problem would arise for North Borneo and 
Sarawak if Brunei joined the Federation of Malaya. Mixed reactions emerged 
from the discussion in the meeting. Firstly, the point was made that the 
indigenous races of the Borneo territories “would not welcome any transfer of 
rule from British colonial servants (whom they regarded as their protectors) 
to Malays or Chinese (whom they traditionally feared)”.72 At the same time, 
it was felt, a federation of the ive territories would have advantages because 
Brunei’s tendency was to lean towards Malaya and away from her two 
neighbours; thus, the absorption of Singapore could more easily be achieved 
in this manner than through a bilateral merger.73 The “Grand Design”, it was 
argued, should not be discounted and could be seen as a potential long-term 
solution or a short-term tactical move used to offset any disadvantage resulting 
from Brunei’s joining the federation. 
Writing to the Colonial Ofice on 5 February 1960, Allen noted that he was 
not able to take the discussion of closer association further at the Singapore 
meeting because of the absence of the representative from North Borneo. 
There was, however general agreement that it would be desirable to articulate 
the position to be adopted by Her Majesty’s Government towards any move by 
the Sultan of Brunei in the direction of closer association in Malaya, keeping 
in mind the impact of this position on closer association between Sarawak 
and North Borneo as well as the wider confederation which would include 
Singapore.74 Following this, an important meeting was held at the Colonial 
Ofice chaired by Sir John Martin on 29 March 1960 where the idea of closer 
association between the Borneo territories and the Federation of Malaya and 
71. Record of meeting of Borneo Territories in Singapore chaired by Sir Denis Allen, the Deputy 
Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, 23 Jan. 1960, CO 1030/977 (1). This meeting was 
attended by F.D. Jakeway (Governor of Sarawak), D.C. White (Governor of Brunei) and several 
defence oficials (Lt. Gen. Sir W. Oliver (Canberra), Sir L. Fry (Jakarta), J.A. Pilcher (Manila), 
Col. Cameron (General HQ FARELF), Commander Lee-White (Far East Station) and E.H. 
Peck). See CO 1030/977 (2) Note on the Future of Borneo Territories (undated, c. Jan-Feb. 
1960).
72. Record of meeting of Borneo Territories in Singapore chaired by Sir Denis Allen, 23 Jan. 
1960, CO 1030/977 (1).
73. Ibid.
74. Allen to Melville, 5 Feb. 1960, CO 1030/977 (2).
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Singapore were discussed at length. This meeting, attended by Sir William 
Goode (Governor Designate, North Borneo), W.I.J. Wallace (Colonial Ofice), 
W.J. Smith (Commonwealth Relations Ofice) and N. Nield (Colonial Ofice),75 
considered four potential scenarios in relation to the closer association of the 
British territories and Malaya: irst, the possibility of the closer association of 
North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei; second, the closer association of North 
Borneo and Sarawak, leaving Brunei apart; third, a closer alignment between 
Brunei and the Federation of Malaya; and, fourth, the possibility of a wider 
Federation including Singapore, the Federation of Malaya and the three 
Borneo territories.76 There was general agreement during the meeting that the 
territories could move towards the idea of a closer association “in varying 
stages.” Martin felt that in the long term, the fourth option, the wider federation 
of the Borneo territories with the Federation of Malaya and Singapore “might 
well offer the best prospect for the three Borneo territories.”77 There was also 
a consensus, however, that it would be undesirable to move too quickly in 
the encouragement of a wider Federation. For the present the best course was 
to encourage the closer association of North Borneo and Sarawak and at the 
same time “neither encourage nor discourage a closer alignment between 
Brunei and the Federation of Malaya.”78 
Other developments in the region then hastened the discussions and a new 
sense of urgency became evident, particularly following the deterioration in 
relations between the Dutch and the Indonesians over Dutch New Guinea. On 
5 May 1960, Lord Selkirk wrote to Selwyn Lloyd of the Foreign Ofice on the 
Dutch-Indonesia relations over New Guinea and noted the potential impact 
of this conlict on the British territories in Southeast Asia.79 The seriousness 
of the conlict appears to have motivated the British authorities to hold more 
intense discussions on the future of the British territories in Southeast Asia, 
including the closer association. This was well before the Tunku informed 
Lord Perth of own proposal for a wider federation in June 1960.
Britain’s position on the idea of closer association of Malaya and the 
British-controlled territories in Southeast Asia is further reiterated in a letter 
by a senior oficial of the Colonial Ofice, John Martin, to Dennis Allen on 18 
May 1960 conirming support for the original ‘Grand Design’ envisaged by 
75. Note of meeting at Colonial Ofice chaired by Sir John Martin, 29 March, 1960, CO 
1030/977 (3).
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid. Martin noted at the same time that this idea could face numerous dificulties. First, 
in respect of the relationship between the federation and Singapore and, second, the likely 
reactions from Indonesia and the Philippines.  
78. Ibid. A background paper attached to this note on the meeting of 29 March 1960, states that 
the idea of a closer association of the Borneo territories had been discussed for some time from 
1957 to 1959.
79. Selkirk to Selwyn, 5 May 1960, CO 1030/977 (4).
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MacDonald: “HMG was in favour of a close association between the British 
territories in Borneo and Malaya and Singapore in the long term in line with 
the ‘Grand Design’.”80 Britain felt that the Borneo territories could not survive 
on their own or in a collective entity of the Borneo states. The fear was that 
the stronger neighbours, Indonesia, the Philippines and China, could in the 
longer term pose a serious threat to the political survival of these territories. 
A brief prepared for the Minister of State Lord Perth’s meeting with Tunku on 
10 June 1960 was hopeful that the British government could take advantage 
of the Tunku’s presence at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference 
in London that month to convince him of the mutual beneit of the closer 
association.81
Tunku’s idea of closer association
Interestingly, Tunku had his own ‘Grand Design’ ideas for closer association 
of the Malayan Federation with the Borneo territories. Tunku preferred to 
form a broader federation involving Sarawak and Brunei with the Federation 
of Malaya and had related this to Lord Perth on 10 June 1960 and Lord Home 
a little earlier.82 Tunku expressed some concern over Indonesian intentions 
towards the Borneo states in his discussions. The Tunku had several potential 
combinations in mind: one, a federation between Malaya, Sarawak and Brunei 
with Britain retaining control over North Borneo; and a second which included 
Malaya, all the Borneo territories and Singapore. In his note on the discussion, 
Lord Perth remarked he felt the Tunku was keen to add “something more” to 
the Malayan Federation:
After the usual courtesies the Tunku plunged into the purpose of his visit, namely the 
possibility of federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei. He 
wanted the British government to know that he would be prepared to face such a happening 
although it would give him a great number of headaches. I replied that this was something 
which we hadn’t really given a great deal of thought to … I pointed out that politically 
North Borneo and Sarawak were backward and how it was clearly important that they 
should learn the art of running themselves before they were asked to face decisions on 
their ultimate future … The Tunku then tried a slightly new line and suggested Brunei and 
Sarawak joining the Federation while the British Government remained in North Borneo to 
develop it economically and to use it as a military base.83
80. Martin to Allen, 18 May 1960, CO 1030/977 (5).
81. Brief for the Minister of State for talk with Tunku Abdul Rahman, 9 June 1960, CO 
1030/977 (6A).
82. Memorandum by Far Eastern Department, Colonial Ofice, 22 June 1961. See also note 
by Lord Perth, 10 June 1960, CO 1030/977 (E6B). The Tunku had also related his idea of a 
federation with the Borneo territories to Lord Home on 3 June 1960, noting that “we must be 
ready for an Indonesian move against these territories.” See Brief for Minister of State for Talk 
with Tunku, 9 June 1960, CO 1030/977 (6A).
83. Note by Lord Perth, 10 June 1960, CO 1030/977 (E6B).
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The Colonial Ofice, however, felt Tunku’s proposal was unrealistic.84 
The Secretary of State noted that it would be odd to think of retaining North 
Borneo as a Crown Colony after Sarawak had either become self-governing 
on its own or had merged with the Federation and advised that the Tunku 
should not be encouraged to pursue this line: 
“Brunei, the wealthiest and most Malay of the three territories, is the plum from the Tunku’s 
point of view and once he had got it his interest in the rest might decline.”85 
The British government was not in favour of Tunku’s idea and felt he 
should be discouraged from pursuing it. There were differences over the 
composition of the federation at that stage, with Tunku keen on a smaller 
federation involving Sarawak and Brunei as well as the Malayan Federation, 
while the British government preferred a broader federation involving all the 
Borneo states, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya.
Clearly there was considerable discussion at the highest levels of the British 
administration of the possibility of closer association between the Federation 
of Malaya and the British-controlled territories of Singapore, North Borneo, 
Sarawak and Brunei prior to Tunku’s intimation to Lord Perth on 10 June 
1960. While these discussions were peaking, Tunku’s disclosure to Lord Perth 
about the possibility of a federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, 
Sarawak and Brunei provided a window of opportunity for the Colonial Ofice 
to actively pursue the idea with Malayan leaders.86
A convergence of interests?
It is from this stage that the idea of a wider federation takes on a life of 
its own. The Colonial Ofice came out with a policy paper on the future of 
the Borneo territories and Singapore, after several discussions and following 
Tunku’s proposal, put to Lord Perth on 10 June 1960 the idea of a “Greater 
Malaysia” federation. A Colonial Policy Committee paper [CPC(60)(17)] 
for the British Cabinet was prepared by the Secretary of State in early July 
1960 and was discussed on 27 July of the same year; it clearly relects the 
convergence of interests of the various parties.87 This policy paper became 
the basis for HMG’s policy on the subject of closer association of the British 
territories in Southeast Asia.88 The CPC paper noted that, during a visit to 
84. Draft Cabinet Paper for Colonial Policy Committee (Prepared by Sir John Martin), April 
1961, DO 169/25 (311).
85. Ibid.
86. See Note by Lord Perth, 10 June 1960, CO 1030/977 (35, Annex 2).
87. See Draft Cabinet paper, C.P.C (61), 15 February 1961, CO 1030/978 (121) and Draft 
Cabinet paper, C.P.C (60), 20 Jan. 1961, CO 1030/978 (109).
88. Secretary of State’s paper for the Cabinet titled, Colonial Policy Committee – CPC (60), 
‘Possibility of an association of the British Borneo territories with the Federation of Malaya and 
Singapore’, July 1960, CO 1030/977 (35). 
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London (June 1960) for the Prime Ministers’ Conference, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman ‘raised informally the possibility of a federation of Malaya, Singapore, 
North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.’89 The paper observed that 10 years earlier 
Malcolm MacDonald had put forward the idea that the most favourable plan 
for Britain’s Southeast Asian territories might be some sort of association 
between the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories. This 
idea of closer association had again been given some consideration in recent 
years but “has not got far because local feeling about it in North Borneo and 
Sarawak, while mildly favourable, has not developed much enthusiasm and 
because the Sultan of Brunei is not interested, his eyes being turned towards 
the Federation of Malaya.”90 The memorandum reiterated that Britain had 
always had in mind that Singapore and the Federation of Malaya would one 
day merge and “have publicly blessed this idea on more than one occasion.”91
In relation to the Borneo territories, North Borneo and Sarawak, it was 
felt that the states should ultimately achieve self-government although it was 
recognised that, at the present time, the inhabitants “have no wish other than 
that the territories should remain with us as Crown Colonies.”92 The Borneo 
territories were viewed as being in a very vulnerable position because of 
their geographical position and racial make-up. The paper noted that China, 
Indonesia and the Philippines all have, or could easily work up, interests of 
one kind or another: 
“We certainly would not wish to move out so that anyone else might step in. Even an 
association of North Borneo and Sarawak would not be a very strong state.”93 
The ultimate solution, the paper argued, would be “an association of the 
Federation of Malaya, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei with, if possible, 
Singapore in also.” Thus it concluded that the Tunku’s idea “is not unattractive 
to us.”94 The Secretary of State felt that the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew should 
be consulted, in addition to Australia and New Zealand, 
“Subject to the result of these consultations we should then, as may be seen appropriate, 
sound out conidentially Tunku Abdul Rahman and Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, probably in that 
order, and possibly also the Sultan of Brunei and, subject to the views of the Governors, 






94. Secretary of State’s paper for the Cabinet titled, “Possibility of an association of the British 
Borneo territories with the Federation of Malaya and Singapore,” July 1960, CO 1030/977 (35). 
95. Draft Cabinet Paper for Colonial Policy Committee (Prepared by Sir John Martin), April 
1961, DO 169/25 (314).
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This meeting concluded that the Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, 
Lord Selkirk, who was present, should discuss the matter with oficials in 
Borneo. This discussion eventually took place in Kuching on 20 October 1960. 
As a result of the discussion and a further meeting at Eden Hall, Selkirk made 
several recommendations to the Secretary of State. These recommendations, 
which were supported by those present at the meeting, wanted HMG to accept 
“as the ultimate aim of their policy the development of a political association 
between Malaya, Singapore and the three Borneo territories.”96 But the 
approach to achieving this goal was to be gradual and “adjusted to the rate of 
political evolution in the Borneo territories.” Selkirk also recommended that 
the British government should begin discussions in conidence with Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, Lee Kuan Yew and the Sultan of Brunei.97
The meeting clearly indicated that the British government was now more 
committed to ensuring that the British-controlled territories in Southeast Asia 
eventually achieve a kind of broader union and was beginning to take a more 
pro-active role in promoting the idea. The plan was to be kept conidential 
until a more suitable time for its announcement. Selkirk emphasised that it 
was important to avoid any appearance that Her Majesty’s Government 
was “making the pace in this matter or seeking to impose the idea upon the 
peoples concerned.”98 Selkirk’s recommendations were fully supported by 
the Secretary of State, who noted in his report to the Cabinet that a gradual 
approach was essential: 
“I strongly endorse this (though of course some development outside our control might 
force our hand). If the plan is to be successful, it cannot be rushed. The parties to it must 
evolve it as their own plan.”99 
The Secretary of State felt it was not in Britain’s interest to rush the matter 
and that “the present situation suits us.”100 Thus as of April 1960 there was a 
clear plan, and indeed a potential plan of action, developed by the Colonial 
Ofice aimed at working towards closer association of the British-controlled 
territories in Southeast Asia and the federation of Malaya. This was clear well 
before 10 June 1960 when Tunku Abdul Rahman irst broached the idea of a 
federation with several of the Borneo states in a secret discussion with Lord 
Perth, the Minister of State for Colonies, while in London. 
96. Draft Cabinet Paper for Colonial Policy Committee, April 1961, DO 169/25 (311).
97. Ibid.
98. Draft Cabinet Paper for Colonial Policy Committee (Prepared by Sir John Martin), April 
1961, DO 169/25 (313).
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
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A revised memorandum101 by Sir John Martin was discussed at a meeting 
of the Colonial Policy Committee on 27 July 1961 
“on the long term possibility of a political association of the British Borneo territories 
(the Colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak, and the Protected State of Brunei) with the 
Federation of Malaya and the State of Singapore.”102 
But the Colonial Ofice wanted to ensure that these efforts did not make 
it appear that Britain was now beginning to force the pace.103 Lord Selkirk 
was quite impatient to get the scheme off the ground in order to give Lee 
Kuan Yew, who was under considerable pressure from the leftist parties, some 
encouragement.104
It is during this period that the British worked on Tunku and his colleagues 
(particularly Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Dr Ismail Haji Abdul Rahman) to win 
them over to the British idea of the “Grand Design.” Lee discussed the “Grand 
Design” with Tunku on 23 April 1961 and while the latter was still opposed to a 
merger, he invited Lee “to prepare a paper setting out his ideas on how the Grand 
Design might be achieved.”105 The British had also encouraged Lee to prepare a 
paper on the ‘Grand Design,’ which he produced on 9 May and it was quickly 
forwarded to the federation ministers.106 It was circulated to Razak and other 
Malayan Ministers, and it was hoped it would win over the Tunku thereafter.107 
Lee had visited Kuala Lumpur several times to convince the Tunku of the 
feasibility of the “Grand Design.” The British High Commissioner in Kuala 
Lumpur noted that Lee felt Razak was already won over and he consequently 
relied largely on Razak to “break down Tunku’s prejudice.”108
The role of Duncan Sandys (Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs) 
in this respect is quite important and the Colonial Ofice documents indicate 
that it was Sandys who managed to persuade the Tunku to reconsider his 
101. This is a revised memorandum, – Colonial Policy Committee [CPC(60)17] on the ‘Grand 
Design’ – submitted to the Colonial Policy Committee for consideration by UK Ministers and 
is titled “Possibility of an Association of the British Borneo Territories with the Federation of 
Malaya and Singapore.” See R. Melville to N. Pritchard, 7 April 1961, DO 169/25. Melville 
notes that the only point of substance on which it differed from the earlier paper was ‘that it 
comes down deinitely against an early public statement by HMG.’
102. Draft Cabinet Paper for Colonial Policy Committee (Prepared by Sir John Martin), April 
1961, DO 169/25 (311).
103. Draft Cabinet Paper for Colonial Policy Committee, April 1961, DO 169/25 (311). The 
governors of Sarawak and North Borneo and the High Commissioner for Brunei and Lord Perth 
were present at the meeting.
104. Minute by R.C. Ormerod, 26 April 1961, DO 169/25.
105. Selkirk to MacLeod, 4 May 1961, CO 1030/979 (2).
106. Selkirk to MacLeod, 4 May 1961, CO 1030/979 (203).
107. Moore to Iain MacLeod of the Colonial Ofice, 10 May 1961, DO 169/25 (230).
108. British High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur, to Commonwealth Relations Ofice (CRO), 
26 May 1961, DO 169/25 (220).
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objections to the idea of the greater federation, particularly in view of the 
political developments in Singapore. Lee told Selkirk that he felt Sandys 
“had brought the realities of the situation to the Tunku’s attention.”109 At this 
stage there is a clearer crystallizing of Britain’s idea of the greater federation 
modelled on the “Grand Design,” developed earlier by MacDonald.110 
In the meantime, the Tunku made an announcement in Singapore on 27 May 
1961, stating his desire for closer association between the British-controlled 
territories in Southeast Asia and the Federation of Malaya. The political 
situation in Singapore had deteriorated after the PAP lost in a by-election 
in April 1961 and it was feared that Lee’s government may fall. The Tunku 
intimated to the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur a day before 
that he felt the Grand Design was a better means of insulating the federation 
from the political deterioration in Singapore.111
The idea of Grand Design or Greater Malaysia took on a life of its own 
after Tunku Abdul Rahman’s announcement. Tunku wrote to Commonwealth 
Secretary Duncan Sandys on 15 June 1961 and then to the British Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan on 26 June 1961 giving a more detailed outline of 
his proposed idea of a wider federation. In the letter to Duncan Sandys he spelt 
out the steps that should be taken and his ideas of the federation.112 The Tunku 
then wrote a three-page memorandum to Macmillan on 26 June explaining 
his idea of the new federation in hopes that it would serve as a basis for 
discussion. The Tunku proposed that as a irst step, the Borneo territories were 
to be brought into the federation as units. Following this, a greater federation 
would be formed with Singapore. In the memorandum the Tunku noted: 
It would not be out of place therefore if these territories were brought together into closer 
ties with the Federation of Malaya. It is proposed therefore as a irst step that the territories 
of Brunei, Borneo and Sarawak be brought into the Federation as units of the Federation, 
enjoying the same rights and privileges as the States which presently form the Federation 
of Malaya … After the merger of these territories with the Federation of Malaya, the 
next logical step would be to form a greater federation with Singapore. As the present 
Constitution of Singapore requires to be reviewed in 1963, the most appropriate time for 
preliminary discussions with Singapore would be before that date.113
Following an exchange of letters with the British Prime Minister who 
was supportive of the idea – which lightened Britain’s burden in Southeast 
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Asia – the process of formal negotiations began. It took two years before the 
Federation of Malaysia as visualised earlier by MacDonald came into being 
on 16 September 1963.
Conclusion
The idea of a wider federation between Malaya and the British territories in 
Southeast Asia was a subject of much discussion in the immediate post-Second 
World War period and various ideas emerged. The British Commissioner-General 
for Southeast Asia Malcolm MacDonald clearly played a prominent role in the 
evolution of the idea in the early 1950s. He pushed for substantive high-level 
discussion of the idea of a “greater federation” both in Malaya and Singapore on 
the one hand and in the Borneo territories on the other, as well as in the Colonial 
Ofice. MacDonald felt that a wider entity encompassing Malaya, Singapore 
and the Borneo territories would create a stronger nation-state which could 
compete ably with its larger neighbours. His persistence in pushing the idea led 
to more substantive talks and its acceptance in the Colonial Ofice. Although 
MacDonald left Malaya in 1955 the idea was revived by the Colonial Ofice in 
the subsequent years, and in particular in 1960 serious discussions were held in 
the Colonial Ofice in response to political developments in Singapore. These 
developments took place before Tunku Abdul Rahman suggested the idea of a 
wider federation to Lord Perth in May 1960, and well before Tunku made the 
announcement of ‘closer association’ on 27 May 1961. While Tunku’s public 
announcement in 1961 had an impact on the formal negotiations on the formation 
of the federation of Malaysia, the path to ‘Greater Malaysia’ had already been 
laid well before May 1961. A convergence of interests between Britain and the 
Malayan and Singapore governments in 1960-61 clearly provided the catalyst 
for formal negotiations to take place. The formation of the federation enabled 
Britain to speed up the decolonisation process in Southeast Asia and at the same 
time enabled Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories to address their 
various political, economic and security concerns.
Note on primary records
The primary Colonial Ofice records related to the formation of the 
federation of Malaysia such as the CO 1030, CO 1022 and DO 169 are kept at 
The National Archives of Britain (TNA) in Kew, London. 

